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Abstract 
 Due to advancements in telecommunications and transportation over the past century, the 
world is shrinking and physical boundaries are being eroded. The advent of globalization has 
facilitated the ﬂow of ideas, values, goods, and people from one part of the world to another. 
This hyperbolic human activity has altered the structure of inter-civilizational relations and has 
spawned a spirited debate on how to create a multi-civilizational world order. This paper is crit-
ical of contemporary approaches on the subject that envisage the primacy of one civilization on 
the one hand and a clash among civilizations on the other. By examining Ibn Khaldun’s theory 
of ʿUmrān and the discipline of Fiqh, it argues that these concepts remain relevant for our 
understanding of the human condition today. While the theory of ʿUmrān analyzes political 
and economic relations at the macro-level, Fiqh tries to arrange societal relations at the micro-
level. This paper also studies the Ottoman legacy since the Ottoman state was founded on Fiqh 
and the Millet system. It proved to be successful in preserving pluralistic communities based 
on principles of autonomy and mutual coexistence. Even though Ibn Khaldun was one of the 
pioneers in the ﬁeld of civilizational studies, his seminal work is largely neglected in scholarly 
circles today, both Muslim and non-Muslim alike. The present inquiry seeks to address this 
shortcoming. 
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 Introduction 
 Recently, civilisation has become a popular unit of analysis in the social 
sciences, including history, sociology, political science, and international 
relations. Although the variables of religion and culture are examined in aca-
demia, these units of analysis have increasingly become subsumed within the 
study of civilisation. Depending on the discipline and one’s worldview, Islam, 
Christianity and Judaism are simultaneously referred to as religion, culture 
and civilisation. A cluster of academics from eclectic ﬁelds seek to interpret 
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and explicate inter-civilisational dynamics in order to predict the future. 
Though not as pervasive as it is today, inter-civilisational relations have been 
a special area of interest since the earliest times, including divergent dis-
courses on methodology and interpretation. How are we to analyse civilisa-
tions and inter-civilisational relations? Stated diﬀerently, which theories and 
methods ought we to utilise in civilisational research? The present inquiry 
will seek to resolve the above questions by comparatively examining theories 
of inter-civilisational relations, from Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406 CE/ AH 732–
808) (Ibn Khaldun, 1951) to some contemporaneous approaches on the sub-
ject in the hope of amending insuﬃciencies begotten by the lack of Ibn 
Khaldun reference, despite ʿUmrān (examined below) being his greatest over-
all contribution. 
 Ottoman thought has appraised Ibn Khaldun chieﬂy as a theoretician of 
civilisation, with Ottoman thinkers rallying to implement his pertinent the-
ory unto their times (Fleischer 1983). Consequently the question that comes 
to mind at this point is the following. Should we implement Ibn Khaldun 
unto our age? However, such an academic endeavour is currently absent. In 
fact, even those who claim to be Khaldunian scholars neglect his work on 
civilisations.1 
 By accentuating the connection between the conception of civilisation 
nurtured by the discipline of Fiqh, to which Ibn Khaldun belongs, and the 
discipline of ʿUmrān he inaugurated, the paper will oﬀer a contribution to 
civilisational studies, and will submit two proposals, regarding the disciplines 
of ʿUmrān and Fiqh respectively. 
 The First Proposal 
 Let us consider using Ibn Khaldun’s civilisational approach in elucidating 
empirically the structure of inter-civilisational relations in our age of globali-
sation. We should also utilise Ibn Khaldun’s logic to determine the patterns 
in the changes civilisations undergo. Ibn Khaldun provides us an alternative 
to Huntington in explaining inter-civilizational relations. Unlike many who 
oppose Huntington’s ideas, we will not display opposition without proposing 
1  This is most palpably exempliﬁed by the special Ibn Khaldun edition of the Journal of 
Asian and African Studies published, in 1983, commemorating the 650th birthday of Ibn Khal-
dun, which is notorious for its prevarication of his notion of civilisation. Similarly, despite 
speaking of Ibn Khaldun’s pioneering role in modern sciences, such as anthropology, sociology 
and pedagogy, the Egyptian sociologist Ali Abdulwahid Waﬁ, in the preface of the critical edi-
tion of Muqaddimah, bypasses Ibn Khaldun’s theory of civilisations. 
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an alternative. Ibn Khaldun will enable us to construct a new functional 
paradigm that we can use to explain and interpret civilisations and inter-
civilisational relations in a globalising world. In responding to such a need, 
one can not neglect Ibn Khaldun because he is the starting point and the pio-
neer of rendering civilisation the subject of an independent discipline. He 
termed this new study ʿilm al-ʿumrân, science of civilisation. 
 The Second Proposal 
 Let us consider availing ourselves of the normative Fiqh approach to inter-
civilisational relations in organising the relations among civilisations in 
today’s world. Presently we are suﬀering from the torment inﬂicted by the 
lack of a global normative order regulating inter-civilisational relations. 
Throughout the Middle Ages, the Western civilisation failed miserably in 
instituting a pluralistic normative scheme conducive to the facilitation of dis-
tinctive denominations and sects within Christianity, let alone of distinct 
religions and civilisations. This theological and theoretical shortcoming is also 
evident in our current secular spheres of law and social sciences, epitomised 
by the writings of Huntington (1996). From the advent of Islam till the 
Ottoman demise, the approach of Fiqh had been utilised by Muslims in gov-
erning multi-civilisational societies. As will be examined in greater detail, sev-
eral of the civilisations analysed by Huntington (1996) had entirely or 
partially subsisted under Muslim rule bereft of major conﬂicts. 
 The Main Debate: Civilisation or Civilisations? 
 Before proceeding to our examination of inter-civilisational relations, it is 
imperative to address one preliminary question; namely, is there a single 
civilisation, or does humanity possess more than one civilisation? Individual 
thinkers have exhibited divergent attitudes on the subject and they neglect 
the contributions of other civilisations on their own. The second vital ques-
tion is that even though we have hitherto accepted the existence of several 
civilisations, shall the Western civilisation, henceforth, be considered the sole 
civilisation of humanity or will other civilisations continue to survive? 
 In no phase of history has a single civilisation ruled supreme over the 
entire world; notwithstanding the inveterate eﬀorts of some to do so by erad-
icating others. Throughout history, humanity has celebrated more than one 
civilisation. There is no consensus as to the exact number of civilisations; yet, 
no one doubts the existence of several civilisations. Endorsing this view is Ibn 
Khaldun who toiled to understand civilisational transformations and conﬂicts 
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during his time.2 Also accepting the multiplicity of civilisations is Hunting-
ton (1996), attempting in his works to research the changing structure of 
contemporary inter-civilisational relations. 
 A multi-civilisational society is only feasible if predicated upon a concep-
tion of ‘open civilisation’. Insofar as relations with other civilisations are con-
cerned, civilisations may be dually classiﬁed as ‘open’ and ‘closed.’ Open 
civilisations acknowledge the right of existence of other civilisations and 
develop relations embedded in peace. On the other hand, closed civilisations 
strive for global dominance through the evisceration of other civilisations. 
Throughout history, no closed civilisation has realised its goal. As unequivo-
cally demonstrated by Andalusian, Mughal and Ottoman experiences, the 
Islamic civilisation is an ‘open civilisation’ in that it recognises the right of 
other civilisations to exist side by side. The West, alternatively, has erected in 
history a ‘closed civilisation’ based on Christianity, although today the West-
ern civilisation is advancing a campaign towards becoming an open civilisa-
tion by emancipating from being a solely Christian civilisation. However, 
numerous doubts persist with regard to the future of relations with other 
civilisations and, in particular, our relations with the Islamic world. 
 From Hegel to Fukuyama: The Idea of a Single Civilisation 
 According to some Western theoreticians — and thinkers who emulate 
them — there is only one civilisation, toward which numerous nations and 
cultures, in various stages have provided input; ﬁnally reaching its evolution-
ary zenith with the Western civilisation. The foremost theoretician of this 
view in our times is Francis Fukuyama (Fukuyama 1992). According to 
Fukuyama, ‘History,’3 with capital “H,” is a conscious and directional process 
having completed its evolution with Western liberalism. The ‘end of History’ 
thesis is the belief that human society has progressed to the ﬁnal form of 
human governance culminating in the triumph of liberal democracy and free 
markets after the Cold War. Fukuyama points out that liberal democracy, as 
2  Ibn Khaldun’s work is not reserved strictly to Islamic society and civilisation, in that right 
at the outset of his book he unequivocally declares his intention of writing a history of the world. 
For instance Bland appraises Ibn Khaldun’s views on the Judaic civilisation (Bland: 1983). 
3  Fukuyama makes a distinction between “history” with small case, which is what is com-
monly understood from the word history, and “History” with capital H. He deﬁnes the History 
with capital H as follows: “History, that is history as understood as a single, coherent, evolu-
tionary process, when taking into account the exprience of all peoples in all times” (Fukuyama 
1992: xii). Fukuyama inherits this idea mainly from Hegel and Marx. 
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we know it today, has emerged in the early part of the 19th century and was 
one of many alternatives. In essence, the Zeitgeist (spirit of the time) was not 
democratic. Totalitarianism, fascism, imperial monarchies, and socialism or 
communism were all considered acceptable forms of organising political and 
social life. After World War II, all were discredited and human progression 
during the Cold War led to two competing alternatives of human gover-
nance: democracy and free market capitalism on the one hand, and socialism 
or communism on the other. The collapse of communist political systems, 
beginning in 1989, discredited the only alternative to democracy and sig-
nalled the triumph of the democratic ideal. Communism and the planned 
method of production were relegated to the ash heap of history, and the Zeit-
geist was conducive to the spread of democracy to the rest of the world. 
Fukuyama asserts: 
 What is emerging victorious, in other words, is not so much liberal practice, as the 
liberal idea. That is to say, for a very large part of the world, there is now no ideology 
with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democracy, 
and no universal principle of legitimacy other than the sovereignty of the people. 
Monarchism in its various forms had largely been defeated by the beginning of this 
century. Fascism and communism, liberal democracy’s main competitors up till now, 
have both discredited themselves. [. . .] Even non-democrats will have to speak the 
language of democracy in order to justify their deviation from the single universal 
standard (Fukuyama 1992: 45). 
 As such, Fukuyama’s proclamation of the end of history should not be viewed 
simplistically as the end of historical phenomena. Instead, his pronounce-
ments should be seen as the end of ideological conﬂicts since mankind has 
settled on the democratic prototype. Indeed, the ‘spirit of the time’ favours 
democratic tendencies as even non-democratic regimes claim to be demo-
cratic. For instance, the Chinese Communist Party has maintained that its 
expression of Chinese popular will is more democratic then what exists in the 
United States and Europe. The criticism is that democracy in the West is 
dominated by special interests of elites who are able to advance their narrow 
policies and platforms through the various bureaucratic channels. The Chi-
nese government claims to represent the desires of the masses and, as such, is 
more democratic than Western counterparts. Even brutal totalitarian regimes, 
like North Korea, espouse the democratic standard in their acronym DPRK 
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). 
 To Fukuyama, the triumph of democratic virtues is undeniable, and this 
has implications for theory as well as policy. Borrowing from the work of 
Immanuel Kant and Michael Doyle, Fukuyama argues that the spread of 
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democracy not only leads to the end of ideological conﬂicts but creates a fed-
eration of states who do not wage war against one another. According to the 
democratic peace theory, all democracies have the following in common: 
freedom from arbitrary authority, political participation, and the protection 
and promotion of basic freedoms. These commonly shared values among 
democratic regimes leads to the end of ideological conﬂicts and the creation 
of a paciﬁc union of states. Democracies will continue to wage war against 
non-democracies, but the belief is that they will not wage war against one 
another. 
 Evident in such conceptualisations of history is the ideology of Western 
superiority. Humanity has but one civilisation represented by the West, which 
societies aspiring to become ‘civilised’ must wholeheartedly embrace, at the 
expense of theirs. Like Hegel and Marx, Fukuyama believes that history, since 
the advent of humanity, is advancing linearly on the path of evolution, albeit 
the pertinent evolution is not perennial and the path not forever open. Lib-
eral democracy is the ﬁnal stage of humanity’s evolution as propounded by 
Hegel, while Marx applies this linearity to the culmination of socialism. 
What this entails for the non-Western societies is the westernisation of their 
civilisation, as the theory presumes that non-Western civilisations are static 
and trapped somewhere in a certain phase of evolution. The Western civilisa-
tion is impossible to be surpassed. Even its reproduction is inconceivable. 
This is epitomised in the following quote: 
 Neither Hegel nor Marx had believed in the unremitting eternal progress of human 
societies. It was more an acceptance of the seizure of progress once the type of society 
congruent with the profoundest desires of mankind was attained. Precisely, both 
thinkers presumed ‘the end of history’. For Hegel it was the liberal state, while for 
Marx, the communist society. Both thinkers held that there would be no further 
progress in the development of basic principles and institutions as all fundamental 
quandaries would eventually be solved (Fukuyama 1992:10–11). 
 Striking is the intense interconnection, in this excerpt, of the notions of ‘evo-
lution’, ‘closed/mortal history’ and ‘closed civilisation’, concepts which in 
their entirety are evoked to underpin Western-centeredness. 
 The advocators of a single civilisation and linear history are by no means 
limited to the examples mentioned above. The tension between the models 
of ‘circular’ and ‘progressive’ history in fact stretches a long way. Judaism and 
Christianity had bestowed upon social life a novel and unique conception of 
time which did not exist in antiquity. It could be said that some thinkers 
from Judaism and Christianity converted the circular notion of history pro-
mulgated by Ancient Greeks, typiﬁed by Plato and Aristotle, with a progressive 
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model, and there is a prevalent aﬃrmation of St. Augustine’s (354–430 CE) 
deﬁning role in the relevant process. Despite the later secularisation of West-
ern thought, this linear and directional conception of time came back to 
haunt all Western philosophies of history thereafter. 
 The linear conception of time thus came to replace the circular one, pecu-
liar to natural investigations, in social and historical research. Although the 
modern theory of history has severed its ties with religion, the progressive 
perception of time, originating from Judaism and Christianity, persists as a 
mental formation even today. Without the conceptions of linear time and 
progressive history, this linear approach to history and the vision of a single 
civilisation of mankind would have been inconceivable. 
 From Ibn Khaldun to Huntington: The Idea of Multiple Civilisations 
 Contrary to the above approach upholding the notion of a single civilisation, 
there are also those who argue that there exist multiple civilisations. The par-
agon example of this view in history is Ibn Khaldun, and among contempo-
rary writers, Samuel Huntington. The fundamental diﬀerence between the 
two thinkers is evinced, however, upon a closer examination of the inescapa-
bility of inter-civilisational conﬂicts and the roots of these conﬂicts. 
 The extent of present-day developments in transportation and communi-
cation have virtually bludgeoned our understanding of distance and altered 
the structure of inter-civilisational relations, and a major modiﬁcation becomes 
necessary. No civilisation is immune from entering an imperative relationship 
with others, which unlike previous times, is not just a privilege belonging to 
geographical neighbours. Therefore, a profound understanding of the con-
temporary web of inter-civilisational relations is becoming increasingly piv-
otal. The impact of one civilisation upon another is no longer limited to the 
frontier as ideas, goods, values, and people cross seamlessly in today’s globa-
lised world. 
 The global developments aforementioned render social research necessary 
in order that we can examine the penetration of inter-civilisational realities. 
However, grave diﬀerences of opinion exist among social scientists on what 
constitutes a civilisation and how can inter-civilisational relations be inter-
preted. This paper will embark upon a comparison of the theory of ʿUmrān 
developed by Ibn Khaldun with other contemporary theories of civilisation. 
It will be argued that the approach of Ibn Khaldun provides insight to our 
human condition today. 
 As a consequence of the developments stated above, ‘multi-civilisational’ 
societies have supplanted single civilisational homogenous societies idiosyncratic 
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of middle and modern ages. The term ‘multi-cultural society’ is commonly 
used by social scientists today. Yet the term ‘multi-civilisational society’ is new 
to the pertinent literature. Considering the mutual interplay and coexistence 
of societies, the term multi-civilisational may be more accurate to describe 
today’s world. Other civilisations are no longer ‘out there’, but are nearby. 
The decline of distance and geographical borders has occasioned a macro and 
micro interweavement of world civilisations. 
 Insofar as the understanding of a multi-civilisational society and world 
order is concerned, Ibn Khaldun possesses the greatest explanatory power 
among current theories of civilisations. For that reason Ibn Khaldun’s sociol-
ogy of civilisations could provide a propitious basis in the search for the 
establishment of a multi-civilisational world order amid the historical cross-
roads we are facing. Two interconnected sources underlie Ibn Khaldun’s 
notion of civilisation. The ﬁrst is the discipline of Fiqh and the second being 
ʿUmrān. The intellectual foundation of the former was the by-product of his 
background in the Maliki jurisprudential school in which he served as a 
jurist, and a high judge (qadiʾl-qudat). 
 A paradigmatic case of a multi-civilisational society has been the Ottoman 
State. Here, societies aﬃliated with a plethora of civilisations lived mutually 
under the shelter of a single political unit. After the city’s conquest, Mehmed 
the Conqueror desired for Istanbul to continue serving as a centre for Ortho-
dox Christians, which prompted him to continue to sanction Patriarchate 
activity in the city. Unsatisﬁed, the Ottomans even went to the extent of 
establishing the Armenian Patriarchate and the Jewish Rabbinate, upholding 
the policy of turning Istanbul into a centre for diﬀerent religions and civilisa-
tions. Istanbul, thus, eﬀectively became the single most important global cen-
tre for Islamic, Christian and Judaic civilisations, a structure whose remnants 
are extant even today. 
 The Ottoman Millah system, founded on Fiqh, proved to be successful 
over the centuries in preserving pluralistic communities. Each religious com-
munity was jurisprudentially incorporated within the Millah system and was 
classiﬁed as an independent socio-cultural unit. In accordance with Fiqh, the 
only prerequisite of being inducted as a member of the society of civilisa-
tions, as stipulated by Islam, was the acceptance of Darūriyyāt (axiomatic 
principles and rights) which was also called Kulliyyāt (universal principles).4 
Darūriyyāt was comprised of self-evident axiomatic principles governing human 
relations accepted unconditionally by everyone from diﬀerent civilisations. 
4  The relevant universal and axiomatic principles are based upon the six inviolable rights, 
namely those of life, property, religion, mind, dignity and family-progeny. 
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What was, thus, expected from a prospective civilisation aspiring to join the 
society of civilisations was merely a pledge of abidance by the principles 
already accepted beforehand, and there existed no such demand to embrace 
any forms of novel values. Keeping with Fiqh, the pertinent axiomatic prin-
ciples and universal principles consisted of basic human rights that guaran-
teed the inviolability of a person’s life, property, religion, intellect, family and 
dignity. By all means, various civilisations were permitted to establish distinct 
values apart from the sphere of Darūriyyāt. Fiqh was triumphant in mediat-
ing between universalism and parochialism, preserving cultural identities on 
the one hand, and constructing an inclusive platform of coexistence on the 
other. 
 Here, the inspiration behind Ibn Khaldun’s thought and Fiqh needs reiter-
ation. Being a jurist of the Maliki School, Ibn Khaldun’s cogitations of his-
tory and civilisation are the by-product of his legal knowledge.5 The essential 
source of his revenue throughout the greater bulk of his life came from 
lecturing on Fiqh at Al-Azhar University in medieval Cairo, which was one 
of the leading centres of scholarship at the time. He often served as a high 
judge in the multi-civilisational societies that extended from Andalusia and 
Morocco to Egypt and Syria. For this reason, a multi-civilisational social 
order is accepted in his Muqaddimah as an incontrovertible reality, and there 
is no mention of encouraging Islam’s obliteration of other civilisations in 
order to exercise hegemony over them. 
 It remains quite plausible even today to draw from this theoretical approach 
in comprehending and organising inter-civilisational relations. Phrased plainly, 
will the Western civilisation at the apex of current global power emulate the 
Islamic model of the Middle Ages and allow for the survival of other civilisa-
tions? Or, will it seek global dominance and homogeneity? At this important 
juncture, the vitality and potential contribution of Ibn Khaldun becomes man-
ifest, especially when juxtaposed to Western notions of global pre-eminence. 
 An Ibn Khaldunian approach based on civilisational pluralism will prove 
invaluable for the Western civilisation. This is because Western civilisation 
has yet to develop the conceptual and institutional paraphernalia to provide a 
5  In his article on Ibn Khaldun, published for the ﬁrst time in 1933, Gibb attempts to dem-
onstrate the importance of the inﬂuence of being a Maliki jurist has had on the thought of Ibn 
Khaldun. The same emphasis is made also by Franz Rosenthal, an translator of Muqaddimah to 
English, and Bruce Lawrence. For Gibb’s ideas underlining the necessity of appraising Ibn 
Khaldun as a Maliki jurist, see (Gibb, 1962: 166–175). For Franz Rosenthal’s call to under-
stand Ibn Khaldun in the context of his era wherein religion and science has not yet separated, 
see (Rosenthal, 1983: 166–178). For Bruce Lawrence’s writings accentuating the importance of 
Ibn Khaldun’s allegiance to Islam, see: (Lawrence, 1983: 154–165, 221–240). 
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bulwark against inter-civilisational clashes. Ibn Khaldun thus confers an 
opportunity inasmuch as his civilisational approach markedly diﬀers from 
Western theoreticians like Toynbee, Huntington and Fukuyama. 
 Ibn Khaldun’s Sociology of Civilisations and Macro-Fiqh 
 For humans who inhabit a multi-civilisational world, it is an insurmountable 
need to understand civilisations and how to organise relations among them. 
This eﬀort will imperatively entail a macro sociological analysis.6 Throughout 
Islamic history, this problem has occupied the agendas of historians and 
jurists alike, which has contributed to the advent of pluralistic societies. 
Simultaneously in the West, however, these precise issues of multi-culturalism 
and multi-civilisationalism were disowned, and even feared. Ibn Khaldun’s 
framework is an analysis at the macro level and this realisation necessitates 
the prior construction of units of analysis. 
 In accordance with this objective, Ibn Khaldun generally makes use of 
three terms: Madaniyyah, ʿUmrān and Ijtimāʾ. He contends that all three are 
synonyms inherently expressing the same concept: civilisation. To these three 
terms, Ibn Khaldun also adds Millah. Noteworthy is the fact that his overrid-
ing preference lays with the terms ʿUmrān and Ijtimāʾ, and he recoils from 
the excessive use of Madaniyyah which he divulges is a term peculiar to phi-
losophers. He uses ʿUmrān and Ijtima to explain the social structure of a 
civilisation, and in contrast, he uses Millah to highlight the cultural and reli-
gious conﬁguration of it. 
 It is erroneous therefore to assume — contrary to ungrounded conven-
tional contentions — the word Madaniyyah to be a 19th century translation 
of the Western term “civilisation” and, similarly, Ijtimāʾ to be a modern trans-
lation of sociology. Both Madaniyyah and Ijtimāʾ were already profoundly 
anchored concepts of Islamic and Turkish thought, an argument we can vin-
dicate by referring to Ibn Khaldun’s work and translation by Sheikhʾul-Islām 
Pîrizāde Mehmed Efendi (1674–1748 CE). 
 Ibn Khaldun begins the prologue of the opening chapter of the ﬁrst book 
of Muqaddimah as follows; 
6  Preponderantly, two types of analysis are undertaken in sociology: micro (on an individual 
scale) and macro (on a group scale). A micro analysis concentrates on individuals’ social rela-
tions, behaviour or actions. A macro analysis, on the other hand, investigates the behaviour and 
relations of groups or corporations. The unit of micro analysis is the individual, while of macro 
analysis is the corporate social actor such as family, state and civilisation. 
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 ﻉﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻﺍ  ﻥﺍ  ﻰﻓ  ﱃﻭﻷﺍ  .ﺕﺎﻣﺪﻘﻣ  ﻪﻴﻓﻭ  ﺔﻠﻤﳉﺍ  ﻰﻠﻋ  ﻯﺮﺸﺒﻟﺍ  ﻥﺍﺮﻤﻌﻟﺍ  ﻰﻓ  ﻝﻭﻷﺍ  ﺏﺎﺘﻛ  ﻦﻣ  ﻝﻭﻷﺍ  ﺏﺎﺒﻟﺍ
 ﻮﻫ ﻯﺬﻟﺍ ﻉﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻﺍ ﻦﻣ ﻪﻟ ﺪﺑﻻ ﻯﺃ ،ﻊﺒﻄﻟﺎﺑ ﻰﻧﺪﻣ ﻥﺎﺴﻧﻻﺍ :ﻢﳍﻮﻘﺑ ﺀﺎﻤﻜﳊﺍ ﻪﻨﻋ ﱪﻌﻳﻭ .ﻯﺭﻭﺮﺿ ﻰﻧﺎﺴﻧﻻﺍ 
.ﻥﺍﺮﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻰﻨﻌﻣ ﻮﻫﻭ ﻢﻬﺣﻼﻄﺻﺍ ﻰﻓ ﺔﻴﻧﺪﳌﺍ
 The opening chapter of the ﬁrst book pertains to anthropic ʿUmrān in general. Here 
prevail some premises (muqaddemāt), ﬁrst of which is: It is of necessity for humans to 
live communally. Hukemā (philosophers) articulate this as such: Humans are natu-
rally predisposed to sociality. That is, humans cherish an absolute need to society 
(‘Ijtimā’ ), which in their terminology corresponds to Madaniyyah, which in turn 
denotes ʿUmrān (Ibn Khaldun 1981: I, 337). 
 The excerpt illustrates Ibn Khaldun’s emphasis towards construing ʿUmrān, 
Madaniyyah and ‘Ijtimā’ as cognates. Let us now inspect Pîrîzāde’s translation 
of the relevant section: 
 Section One: (It) is in elucidation of the sociality, across countries and regions, of the 
sons of Adam residing in the prosperous world. A few prologues are comprised in 
this section, ﬁrst of which clariﬁes the imperativeness of human beings to reside and 
dwell communally in districts. Precisely, it is unfeasible for human beings to dwell 
like animals in solitude and it is a corollary of their nature to at all times seek collec-
tivity in dwelling and abode. Philosophers, enthused by this sociality, have deﬁned 
this circumstance by asserting ‘humans are naturally predisposed to sociality’, and 
in their terminology, civilisation (Madaniyyah) consists in the sociality of mankind 
on the realm of earth. In fact, as the word medina (city), in the Arabic language, is 
aﬃxed to cities wherein humans are socially gathered individually and in numbers, 
such is the explanation . . . (Ibn Khaldun 1275: 48–49). 
 The death of Sheikhʾul-Islām Pîrîzāde Mehmed Efendi, the ﬁrst person to 
translate Muqaddimah from Arabic to Turkish, was in the ﬁrst half of the 
18th century. This establishes the fact that the term Madaniyyah, meaning 
civilisation, was not a novel concept bequeathed onto Turkish thought from 
the West during the Tanzimat period (late Ottoman reforms). As we noted 
earlier, however, classical Islamic thinkers favoured other synonymous con-
cepts in place of Madaniyyah, which became fashionable only in the conclud-
ing phase of the Ottomans. In passing, as will be elaborated shortly, one must 
remind the reader of the misuse of Madaniyyah by some Western writers, 
which is also true for Millah.7
7  The existence of concepts whose corresponding social actualities have ceased to exist may 
only subsist on the abstract mental level, which may not be always possible. Or these concepts 
may undergo a shift in meaning, becoming utilised to designate other phenomenon. Concepts 
like Millah and Madaniyyah (nation and civilisation) pose as astonishing instances to this 
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 Judging from the above excerpt, the history of the concept of civilisation 
as a unit of analysis employed in sociological investigations can be traced 
back, at least, to Ibn Khaldun and even to earlier philosophers, such as 
Farabi, Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd. Examining their approach to civilisation can 
prove to be very beneﬁcial, but that beckons for a separate research. 
 There are three fundamental reasons, Ibn Khaldun argues, for humans to 
lead a social life: need for nourishment, security and companionship. These 
needs can only be met by living in sociality. Civilisation is thus imperative 
insofar as it accommodates for these three essentials. Humans detached from 
leading a social life cannot satiate these needs through any other means, 
hence the actual impossibility of Ibn Tufayl’s fantasy Hayy ibn Yakzān or Rob-
inson Crusoe. A mighty ruler or state who establishes the rule of law to obvi-
ate social conﬂict is incumbent upon human beings to maintain social order. 
Otherwise people would annihilate one another through force. However, 
argues Ibn Khaldun, the past demonstrates that it is not of historical neces-
sity that this ruler be a prophet, or the administration be based on divine rev-
elation because societies without a prophet or divine law have existed in 
bygone periods. 
 Furthermore, it is not obligatory that all humans establish similar social 
orders. On the contrary, the process of social or civilisational formation is vol-
untary (irādī ), whereas animal communality is instinctual (ilhāmī).8 Humans 
are bound to establish distinct social orders. Thus, the social organisation of 
animals is monotonous, whereas human societies and civilisations display 
variances. As has been argued by Islamic scholars, since God has withheld 
reason from animals, He has recompensed that through instinctual guidance 
which inspires animals to set up similar communities irrespective of where 
they inhabit in the world. What seems to elicit Ibn Khaldun’s astonishment 
circumstance. Although in classical Islamic thought, the term Millah had been used to denote a 
religious community, as a result of a shift in meaning, it has been impregnated, nowadays, with 
racial connotations. The greatest cause of this meaning shift has been the obliteration of the 
actuality to which the concept Millah corresponded, following the destruction of the Ottoman 
Millah system. Again, current implications of the widespread term Madaniyyah, is a certain 
level of development, unlike Ibn Khaldun or Pîrîzāde, who had construed it as ‘Ijtimā’ or 
ʿUmrān. Consequent upon a projection of the current meanings of such terms in readings of 
classical texts or vice versa will doubtless be anachronism. No such consensus exists even today 
with regard to the deﬁnition of civilisation, thus professing whichever thinker’s conception of 
civilisation we are using may hinder possible conﬂicts. 
8  The concept ilhāmī here is used as an antonym of irādī and designates the behaviour of 
animals as inspired by God. Today the same occurrence is labelled as instinctual, according to 
which actions of animals are characterised. 
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however are human societies, exhibiting diﬀerences, and formed amid a vol-
untary process of the human will. 
 From this it must not be construed that Ibn Khaldun envisages human 
will as the sole founding element able to accomplish everything within its 
desire. Humans are the by-product of their socialisation as their economic 
structures, political institutions, and cultural orientations place limitations 
on their behaviour. The structure-agency9 tension (Sewell, 1992: 1–29) is 
perceivably reﬂected in Ibn Khaldun’s work, without sacriﬁcing one for the 
other to the point of becoming ensnared by a deterministic attitude. A deter-
ministic attitude exclusive of agency can be applied to animal packs, the 
upshot of the intuitive process that displays uniformity throughout the world. 
However, a reciprocal impact holds sway in human societies between struc-
ture and agency. Within the perplexing process of history and society, the 
human will plays a role, albeit to a limited extent. 
 The attempt to render civilisation, as a product of human will operating 
within the constraints of social and historical laws, into the subject of an 
independent discipline belongs to Ibn Khaldun. He personally recounts with 
satisfaction that he turned it into an autonomous inquiry what had been pre-
viously examined as a secondary approach by other disciplines. Ibn Khaldun 
mentions that theologians and jurists from previous generations had appraised 
the matter of civilisation simply as a topic in their own scholarly discussions. 
According to Ibn Khaldun, Muslim theologians adduced the founding of 
society as a proof necessitating prophethood,10 and jurists regarded the pro-
tection of civilisation among the objectives of Fiqh. Ibn Khaldun additionally 
accentuates the jurists’ emphasis on the role of language in social communi-
cation as an imperative of catering to social needs. To cite an example, the 
Risālah of Shaﬁi, Mustasfā of Ghazzāli and Mahsūl of Rāzī predominantly 
engage in linguistic and hermeneutic debates, disclosing explanations relating 
to the interpretation of both holy texts and human discourse. 
 Another area of conﬂuence between Ibn Khaldun’s ʿUmrān theory and jur-
isprudential (Fiqh) thought is to be found at the level of analysis. On the 
whole, Ibn Khaldun undertakes a macro level analysis in Muqaddimah. 
Fuqahā thinking alternately examines human action simultaneously at the 
macro and micro levels. The construction of the units of analysis on the 
 9  The subject dealt with in contemporary sociology as the relationship between structure 
and agency, remains a pivotal area of debate, detaining the attention of many sociologists. 
10  Mutakallimūn or the Muslim theologians hold that an ideal society may only be founded 
by a prophet receptive of divine revelation. Concomitantly, an ideal society is governed by 
norms based on revelation; hence the unassailable need, as per mutakallimūn, for prophets in 
mankind’s process of instituting society. 
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macro level may bear similarities as well as diﬀerences. In Fiqh, the concept 
Millah is used to denote civilisations and societies with distinct cultures.11 
Ibn Khaldun is no stranger to the concept of Millah, although he develops a 
classiﬁcation that incorporates economic and political structures and their 
phases of historical change. Therefore, the terms ‘Ijtimā’ and ʿUmrān are more 
congruent with this overall purpose. 
 As such, two classiﬁcations, accentuating diﬀerent aspects of civilisation, 
emerge in the Islamic tradition; namely, the cultural approach of the jurists, 
and the economic and political approach of Ibn Khaldun’s ʿUmrān discipline. 
Ibn Khaldun, a Maliki jurist and historian, has eﬀectively made use of both. 
 Quite discernible is the jurisprudential impact upon Ibn Khaldun, partic-
ularly, staying loyal to our subject, the subsequent factors: 
 (1)  The outward-inward diﬀerentiation: Fiqh deals with human behaviour, 
demarcating the outward (observable) and inward (unobservable) 
aspects of actions and social phenomena, an ontological, epistemologi-
cal and methodological separation. Fiqh accepts that each deed is at 
once inward and outward; by inward is meant the undetectable aspect 
of human behaviour, not the mysterious or esoteric immune to com-
prehension.12 Likewise, Ibn Khaldun’s accent on bātin (i.e., esoteric) 
has nothing to do with the Bātiniyye movement.13 Intentions, for 
instance, as conceded by jurists in their entirety, belongs to the inner 
part of the deed. Inward and outward are even considered as the two 
sub-branches of Fiqh. In tandem, as history has inward and outward 
aspects, Ibn Khaldun aﬃrms, historiography takes to task the outward 
of history, while ʿUmrān delves in to its innermost. Becoming trans-
parent here is the espousal of a multi-layered conception of being, in 
that ‘outwardly’, history is but conveying data pertaining to prior eras, 
states and previous generations of foregone ages, whereas ‘inwardly’, 
history is cogitation (nazar), investigation (tahqiq) and the explication 
of facts within the chain of cause-eﬀect, and its principles are meticu-
lously reﬁned (Ibn Khaldun, 1981: I, 282). 
 (2) Levels of analysis: A macro level social analysis is undertaken with and 
as a complimentary of that of a micro level. Reminiscent of the 
emphasis of Fiqh on the actions and relations of humans individually 
11  Through the Millah (in Turkish millet) system, the fuqaha were able to obviate conﬂict 
among civilisations they classiﬁed according to diﬀerence in culture, or more precisely religion. 
12  For Ibn Khaldun’s eﬀort of delving into the esoteric dimension of history, see (Lacoste, 
1984: 149–150). 
13  For Ibn Khaldun’s conception of science, refer to (Ahmad, 2003). 
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and communities collectively, Ibn Khaldun lays the accent on ʿUmrān 
and sociality, examining various phases of ʿUmrān and their relations 
with each other. 
 (3) Method: Ibn Khaldun has applied many methods current in the meth-
odology of Fiqh to the discipline of ʿUmrān, the most important of 
which is analogy (qiyās), where Ibn Khaldun argues for the need to 
compare unobservable phenomena with the observable.14  
 The inference from what has been articulated thus far is that Muslim philoso-
phers, jurists and theologians had indeed conducted macro level analyses on 
civilisation and society, without, however, envisioning it as a subject-matter 
of an independent discipline. Ibn Khaldun’s contribution precisely lies in his 
ascertainment of the vitality of society and civilisation, hitherto studied as a 
bare subject, and its transformation into the subject of a new discipline. 
 One feature, however, needs an emphatic reiteration. Ibn Khaldun’s con-
ception of civilisation diﬀers from previous and contemporaneous thinkers. 
Dovetailing his idea of civilisation with the contemporary approach would 
lead us to make grave mistakes of scholarship and judgment of civilisations. 
Such a mistake would be a manifest case of anachronism, which is the root 
cause of the misunderstandings of contemporary interpreters of Ibn Khaldun, 
Muslims and Westerners alike. Perhaps the best illustration of this anachro-
nism is epitomised by the opinion of many commentators that envisage Ibn 
Khaldun as the pioneer of positivist social science. Regardless of Ibn Khal-
dun’s lead in those ﬁelds, depicting him as inclining toward a positivistic atti-
tude would at best be preposterous, as mentioned above. He transcends 
positivism by virtue of acknowledging the inherently inward and outward 
scopes of history. 
 As mentioned above, the diﬀerence between Ibn Khaldun’s concept of 
civilisation and the modern understanding of it is not literal. But there are 
diﬀerences of essence, and these diﬀerences need to be exposed. Not only 
are there diﬀerences between Ibn Khaldun and Western thinkers, but there 
are doubtless disparities between Ibn Khaldun’s concept of civilisation and 
that of other Muslim intellectuals. Again, this notion of anachronism consti-
tutes the fundamental reason as to why Ibn Khaldun is misunderstood by 
both some Western and Muslim interpreters. 
 Another facet that demands attention is the branding of Millahs (religious 
communities) as civilisations. In classical Islamic thought, religious communities 
14  Ibn Khaldun argues through analogy (qiyās) of the past with the present and of the unob-
servable with the observable for the possibility of refraining from some superstitious construal 
of historical events. 
 R. Şentürk, A. M. Nizamuddin / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 516–546 531
are referred to as Millah which literally means nation. Presently, this term is 
replaced with the term civilisation. Instead of the term ‘Islamic nation’, for 
instance, the term ‘Islamic civilisation’ is commonly adopted. Similarly, the 
usage of the appellation ‘Judeo-Christian civilisation’ is widespread to desig-
nate the Western civilisation. Noam Pianko has commented that Mordecai 
Kaplan’s groundbreaking deﬁnition of Judaism with the term civilisation is a 
signiﬁcant contribution to modern Jewish thought (Pianko, 2006: 39–55). 
The same applies also to Islam, Christianity and Buddhism, religions all 
redeﬁned as civilisations. This has been exempliﬁed by Huntington’s classi-
ﬁcation of the world into civilisations based on diﬀerences of religion. The 
units Huntington refers to as civilisation were termed Millah by Fuqahā. 
 The shared quality of the approaches of the Fuqahā and Huntington is 
their cultural and religious undertones. Yet Ibn Khaldun pins the concept of 
ʿUmrān onto a more political and economic basis. The nomadic and seden-
tary ʿUmrāns may have currency in all cultures and religious societies. Hence, 
Ibn Khaldun’s emphasis, unlike Huntington, is on the type of social, political 
and economic organisation instead of religion. 
 Despite these major diﬀerences, the approaches endorsed by Ibn Khaldun, 
the Fuqahā and Huntington share a common denominator. All argue that no 
society is external to civilisation. The jurists believe that each society is ineluc-
tably a part of Millah, and Ibn Khaldun asserts that each society possesses an 
ʿUmrān, whether nomadic or settled.15 Similarly, according to Huntington, 
each society is a member of a civilisation. As such, the concept of ʿUmrān, 
upon which is incumbent the responsibility of analysing on a macro level and 
arranging all social relations, is only possible with the concepts of civilisation 
or Millah. 
 However, while classical Islamic thought endows social and legal equiva-
lence to Millahs and ʿUmrāns, Huntington advocates the superiority of the 
Western civilisation which is predicated upon universal human rights and 
individual freedoms. He contends that other civilisations either completely 
lack these ideals or developmentally lag behind the Western prototype. Even 
though Huntington may accept that all mankind is aﬃliated with a civilisa-
tion, he does not consider all of them on an equal par with the Western 
civilisation, and this accentuates notions of Western superiority. 
15  Badāwah and hadārah (nomadicness and settlement) are two characteristics aﬃxed to 
ʿUmrān, with which we will deal in greater detail in our evaluation of the accidents of civilisa-
tion below (Ibn Khaldun, 1981: I, 287). Ibn Khaldun thus holds that nomads also possess an 
idiosyncratic civilisation. This approach is patently the opposite of that which uses civilisation 
to deﬁne societies evincing a certain level of ‘development’. 
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 The Discipline of ʿUmrān and Its Essential Accidents 
 History, as indicated above, has two strata: inward and outward. On the out-
ward surface, the discipline of history communicates past events, civilisations 
and states, by the narrative method, while inwardly, it undertakes an inter-
pretation by means of cogitation, investigation and inference (Ibn Khaldun, 
1981: I, 276). Insofar as their subject-matters are concerned, Ibn Khaldun 
notes a resemblance between political science and rhetoric, albeit underlining 
signiﬁcant divergences between the two. 
 Methodologically, disciplines during the time of Ibn Khaldun were cate-
gorised into two, namely khatābī (rhetorical) and burhānī (rational). Histori-
cal sciences were predominantly regarded under khatābī disciplines, and the 
burhānī section boasted branches such as philosophy, methodology of Fiqh 
and Kalām. Ibn Khaldun held that although ʿUmrān externally uses narra-
tion, a method characteristic of the khatābī method, it ultimately is a disci-
pline that internally employs a rational method, a trademark of the latter. 
 Ibn Khaldun embraces traditional metaphysics predicated upon a separa-
tion of essence ( jawhar) and accident (ʿarad ). In terms of basic attributes, 
Ibn Khaldun believes all civilisations carry similar structural qualities, which 
he labels al-‘avārid al-dhātiyye, essential accidents. The following citation 
sheds light on his objective in Muqaddimah: 
 In it (Muqaddimah) I have expounded, in a manner beneﬁcial to you, the states of 
ʿUmrān and of establishing civilisations, the essential accidents emerging in human 
society, including their causes and eﬀects (Ibn Khaldun, 1981: I, 286). 
 In the excerpt below, Ibn Khaldun uses rational proofs to elucidate the causes 
and eﬀects of the essential attributes of civilisation. His classiﬁcations of the 
essential attributes of civilization are based on dichotomies such as state-nation, 
town-village, dignity-abasement, prosperity-scarcity, science-art, increase-dimi-
nution, nomadic-settled, and present-future: 
 Let it be manifest that the reality of the discipline of history is to impart knowledge 
of human society, the ʿUmrān of the universe, and conditions aﬃxed to its nature, 
like solitude, harmony, tribalism, human hegemony over one another and the 
entailed kingship, states and their levels, human acquirement incurred by their works 
such as gain, imbursement, sciences and crafts, and of the conditions that emerge 
naturally in the pertinent ʿUmrān (Ibn Khaldun, 1981: I, 287). 
 A rough enumeration of the ‘accidental qualities’ (i.e., non-essential and 
changeable qualities) of a civilisation as adumbrated above would include the 
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following: state, nation, religion, town or village, progressiveness or back-
wardness, over-population or under-population, nomadic or settled, present 
or impending, solitude, harmony, group-feeling, triumph, hegemony, king-
ship, authority, proﬁt or loss, subsistence, sciences and the arts. Each disci-
pline in Ibn Khaldun’s era studied the essential-accidents of its subject-matter. 
The chapters of Muqaddimah have been organised according to the essential-
accidents of civilisation. This way the book provides analysis of each essential-
accident of civilisation. 
 Essences characteristically are impervious to change, while accidents are 
predisposed to it, which bestows ʿUmrān a dynamic character, to the extent 
that its accidents are in a process of continual alteration. The subject-matter 
of ʿUmrān, far from being static, is constantly changing. This fact is empha-
sised by Ibn Khaldun lamenting one implicit mistake of historiography as the 
failure to acknowledge the social transformation incumbent upon future gen-
erations imperatively incurred by ﬂeeting times and centuries, which he 
classiﬁes as a covert and menacing illness (Ibn Khaldun, 1981: I, 320). 
 Human civilisation or society, Ibn Khaldun contends, ought to be the sub-
ject of an independent discipline. The subject of this discipline should be 
conditions and accidents attached to civilisation and society. In other words, 
it should exclusively undertake the investigation of the essential-accidents of 
civilisation. 
 We have already mentioned Ibn Khaldun’s sensitivity in stressing the need 
to discern between ʿUmrān and political science, especially in terms of their 
similar subject-matter (Ibn Khaldun, 1981: I, 332). The distinction between 
the two should be readily apparent, in that while the discipline of ʿUmrān 
inherently carries all the accidents of civilisation, political science exclusively 
examines politics. The diﬀerence between rhetoric and ʿUmrān, on the other 
hand, as already indicated, pertains not as much to their subject-matters, but 
rather to their methods. Rhetoric is almost entirely devoid of a speciﬁc sub-
ject. The dividing line between rhetoric and other disciplines is in the use of 
evidential method. 
 Issues within the parameters of ʿUmrān, Ibn Khaldun states, are equally 
current in the burhānī disciplines of philosophy, Kalām, and methodology of 
Fiqh. In substantiating the need for prophethood, philosophers and scholars 
alike, contend that the innate need of humans for collaboration to provide 
continual subsistence entails the need for a ruler. Correspondingly, in expli-
cating the existence of various languages, the methodology of Fiqh deduces 
that humans, as a corollary of the nature of social life and solidarity, evince 
the need of articulating their thoughts, from which stems variations of expres-
sion. Similarly, jurists deduce legal (sharʾî) principles with their intent (maqāsid ), 
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constructing a judgment on the cause (ʿillah) of relevant intent. Thus, the 
prohibition of adultery is to protect progeny, and the injunction forbidding 
murder is to guard the human race. The existence of oppression leads to the 
demise of civilisation. The entirety of this intent, Ibn Khaldun asserts, is 
based upon the foundation of protecting civilisation, rendering incontrovert-
ible the need incumbent upon jurists to undertake theoretical cogitations and 
propound theories regarding the attributes of civilisation (Ibn Khaldun, 
1981: I, 332–333). 
 Civilisations rise and fall with their accidents, whose existence, in turn 
depends on the existence of the civilisation, and vice versa. The collapse of a 
civilisation tears down its sciences and arts. This reality can best be under-
stood by an examination of the contemporary Islamic civilisation. 
 Civilisation, the Nature of Power, and Conﬂict 
 Political authority occupies a pivotal place among a civilisation’s essential 
accidents. Ibn Khaldun contends that the nature of power requires monopoly 
(i.e., possession of power under a single authority), or in the academic lexi-
con, hegemony (Ibn Khaldun, 1981: II, 539). This unavoidable struggle for 
power leads to conﬂict between powers claiming ownership of authority. 
 Ibn Khaldun has constructed his theory of ʿUmrān on a double-layered 
dialectic: internal conﬂicts and external conﬂicts. 
(1) Internal conﬂicts and the continuous cycle of ruling elites: Ibn Khaldun 
places great relevance on the dynamics of internal civilisational conﬂicts. 
In each society, the status of the administrative class is a cause of unre-
mitting conﬂict in which tribalism is paramount. The impossibility of 
the perennial protection of the status of a given administrative class 
leads to the susceptibility of a continuous cycle of change. 
 (2) External conﬂicts and the continuous cycle of civilisations: In examining 
the venture of civilisations, Ibn Khaldun was not merely content with 
investigating their inner dynamics. He also analysed the variable of the 
relations of a given civilisation with others. Insofar as civilisations can-
not subsist in solitude, they are accordingly interlocked in relation-
ships with other civilisations. This, time and again, has led to conﬂict, 
not from diﬀerences of values, but from the desire to establish hege-
mony over other civilisations. 
 A strong civilisation has the disposition for augmenting its power and gradu-
ally acquiring global supremacy. Weak civilisations, Ibn Khaldun believes, 
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 irrevocably imitate the strong, foremost in ideology, fashion and custom (Ibn 
Khaldun, 1981: II, 510). A mode of relationships, however, is not eternal, 
and positions in time are liable to alteration. The strong becomes the weak, 
and vice versa, through which world civilisations undergo a continuous cycle. 
 From the vantage point of historical and social principles, Ibn Khaldun 
perceives no diﬀerence between the Islamic civilisation and others. All civili-
sations operate in accordance with the same laws, and religious diﬀerences do 
not ipso facto develop into inter civilisational political and economic clashes. 
The Islamic civilisation, however, diﬀers from other civilisations primarily by 
the fact that the pertinent civilisation is predicated upon the naqlī (revela-
tional, traditional) sciences. Accentuating the mutuality of rational sciences 
in all civilisations, Ibn Khaldun is quick to underline that naqlī or traditional 
disciplines initially derived from divine revelation to Prophet Muhammad 
(Tafsīr, Hadīth, Fiqh, and Kalām), are exclusively peculiar to Islam.16 Follow-
ing an outline of traditional sciences and their connections to one another, 
Ibn Khaldun notes the following observation. He states, “The entirety of 
these naqlī sciences is idiosyncratic of the civilisation of Islam and its folk” 
(Ibn Khaldun, 1981: III, 1027). The decline of ʿUmrān in the Maghreb 
(North Africa), Ibn Khaldun detects, and the rupture of the chain of hadith 
transmission, were the root causes in the downfall of scholarship. 
 The Past and Future of the Problem of Multiplicity of Civilisations 
 The agenda of creating a world order which is characterized by the multiplic-
ity or plurality of civilisations occupies the attention of the world today. 
Recently, two distinct attitudes are observable. The ﬁrst involves lending sup-
port to Western domination, while the second advocates the cause of forming 
a new world order wherein all civilisations partake in equal relations. The 
Western experience of civilisational relations pre-eminently condones the ﬁrst 
option, whereas the Islamic experience paves the way for the latter. Histori-
cally, this phenomenon had been triumphant as Islam incorporated other 
civilisations. Islamic civilisation presided over other civilisations by develop-
ing a political ediﬁce which provided them freedom of existence, and was 
analogous to a federation of civilisations. So where exactly, in this context, 
does Ibn Khaldun stand? 
16  Ibn Khaldun writes in the Muqaddimah that “Wa hādhihiʾl-ʿulūm al-naqliyye kulluha 
mukhtassah biʾl-milletiʾl-Islāmiyye ve ehlihā” meaning that “these revelational-traditional disci-
plines exclusively belong to Islamic civilisation and its people” (1981, III, 1026–1027). 
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 As substantiated above, Ibn Khaldun is the founder of an independent dis-
cipline perusing civilisations. It is reprehensible that the Ibn Khaldunian 
approach deﬁantly receives but scanty attention in contemporary debates of 
inter-civilisational relations. Despite exalting Ibn Khaldun for his cutting 
edge studies in politics, economics, sociology, history, and so forth — to the 
point of even declaring him as the father of the pertinent disciplines — one 
cannot help but be astounded as to the lack of attention he elicits in the 
debate surrounding civilisations presently (Al-Azmeh, 1982). 
 In our contemporary world of globalisation, does Ibn Khaldun have noth-
ing to oﬀer to the current discussions of civilisations and inter-civilisational 
relations? Or, is the approach of Ibn Khaldun consigned to disrepute simply 
for running counter to the dominant paradigms? Does the discipline of 
ʿUmrān have anything to oﬀer to the current colloquium? Or, should it be 
retired to its resting place in the history of thought? The rest of the paper will 
try to tackle these inquiries. 
 An adequate understanding of the potential functionality of the discipline 
inaugurated by Ibn Khaldun imperatively requires an inspection of the nature 
of the milieu from which it blossomed, and its similarities with the milieu we 
inhabit today. After examining his study, it is evident that Ibn Khaldun’s 
inquiry was the by-product of the changes and conﬂicts of the multi-civilisa-
tional societies during his time that extended from Maghreb to Mashreq, or 
from West to East (in today’s terms, from Spain-North Africa to the Middle 
East). Ibn Khaldun, like every social scientist, attempted to pierce into the 
phenomena occurring in his society, and in hindsight, his thought had 
reﬂected a pluralistic social experience. 
 As such, are we today in an inescapable position of comprehending and 
predicting the future of the society wherein we reside? Today’s world is 
increasingly assuming a pluralistic disposition, a feature which indeed strikes 
a chord with the world Ibn Khaldun had witnessed and appraised in his 
work. Due to these similarities, Ibn Khaldun’s discipline of ʿUmrān has the 
potential of being pertinent to the study of the contemporary multi-civilisa-
tional experience. We can apply Ibn Khaldun’s theory of civilisation and the 
relations among civilisations to explain contemporary civilisations and their 
relations with each other. 
 Ibn Khaldun’s approach regarding civilisations is a product of a multi-valued 
logic. While inter-civilisational relations throughout the Middle-Ages were 
handled with a dual logic, it was the multi-valued logic which attracted the 
preference of the Islamic world. Precisely expressed, while the domineering 
entities of the West during the Middle Ages divided the world into ‘us’ and 
‘others’, Muslims established multi-civilisational or multi-cultural societies. 
Today, it is of necessity to comprehend inter-civilisational relations through a 
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sociological approach based on a multi-valued system of thought. In contrast, 
attempting to interpret the world by slicing it into the Western and the Non-
Western halves would lead to serious quandaries. The dualistic logic is reduc-
tive; it attempts to homogenise, simultaneously, ‘us’ and the ‘other’, although 
neither ‘us’ nor the ‘other’ is homogenous. 
 A multi-valued logic alternately allows ‘us’ to deal with the domain of the 
‘other’, but not a single ‘other,’ through the recognition of the equality of all 
civilisations at the social level. The implementation of the pertinent equality 
pertains to social relations and not on the sphere of theological beliefs. Civili-
sations that diﬀer theologically are bound to foster truth claims that are not 
ecumenical. Besides, such an attempt of reconciliation would contradict 
the ideal of pluralism, inasmuch as it would be tantamount to formulating 
a single theology to preside dominantly over the entire world. Instead, setting 
aside religious and theological diﬀerences would doubtless be of greater beneﬁt. 
 Pluralism accordingly conceived is manifest in Ibn Khaldun’s approach to 
civilisations. Emphasising that constructing a civilisation is a process of will, 
Ibn Khaldun simultaneously points out the propensity of human will and 
reason toward reaching varying conclusions. Ibn Khaldun argues for the pos-
sibility of the existence of secular civilisations. This is in sharp contrast, as 
aforementioned, to Muslim thinkers of that period who regarded the impos-
sibility of the construction of a civilisation without the pedestal of revelation. 
 Contemporaneous to Ibn Khaldun, a cluster of civilisations were living in 
harmony under Muslim rule in the vast Islamic geography stretching from 
Andalusia to Eastern Turkestan. In this order the structure establishing cohe-
sion among the pertinent civilisations regulating inter-civilisational relations 
were sculpted by Fiqh. The system known today as the Millah system was 
concurrently representing — in today’s expression — all existing civilisations. 
These included the Catholic, Orthodox, Coptic, Jewish, Magee, Hindu and 
Buddhist.17 Ibn Khaldun, as a judge and scholar of Fiqh, took this pluralistic 
legal order comprising numerous civilisations and legal codes as a given in 
Muqaddimah. However, the relevant multi-civilisational order collapsed with 
the Ottoman downfall. 
 Bearing in mind today’s conditions, the question of whether Ibn Khaldun’s 
sociology of civilisations still retains its validity may justiﬁably come to mind. 
17  Today these social and cultural entities are, as indicated previously, evaluated as religion, 
culture or civilisation. In the discipline of the history of civilisations, these social structures 
deemed by Ottoman Fukaha as ‘millet’ (in Arabic ‘millah’), are assessed as civilisations, an 
approach gradually spreading also in social sciences. For discussions pertaining to the issue, in 
addition to Huntington’s quoted work, also see (Toynbee, 1962). 
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We can say with certainty that envisaging the current world order as an unal-
terable given falls at odds with history. The multi-civilisational social and 
political order, which had impacted Ibn Khaldun, no longer exists. The 
multi-civilisational circumstance of today poses a problem for humanity, ren-
dering Ibn Khaldun’s sociology of civilisations all the more relevant. 
 Scholars involved in examining inter-civilisational relations have nowadays 
assumed two rival factions. Some allege there to be only a single civilisation, 
namely the Western, with other civilisations having long disappeared. Recent 
ambassadors of this worldview have been Huntington, Fukuyama and Ber-
nard Lewis. In history, advocates of this approach have invariably been fun-
damentalist Evangelical Christians and secular Western post-Enlightenment 
intellectuals. The former group has regarded the Western Christian civilisa-
tion, and the latter, its secular civilisation, superior to other civilisations of 
the world, espousing hegemony through conﬂict. Eminent sociologists Max 
Weber and Karl Marx, to a certain extent, also belong in this category. In the 
opening passages of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber 
1989), Weber writes at great lengths to prove the superiority of the Western 
civilisation. He argues that it is a cut above and has given birth to capitalism. 
Insofar as non-Western civilisations relinquished their developmental quali-
ties and became static, they were unable to follow accordingly. Marx, on the 
other hand, places the West on the top of the evolutionary table, identifying 
the East with despotism. From the perspective of relations of production, 
Marx stigmatises the East under a peculiar category of “the Oriental method 
of production”, isolating it from the contemporary civilisation. Regarding 
class structure and the mode of production, the West and East are distinct; 
the latter has regressed, and therefore must emulate the former. Clearly West-
ern imperialism receives legitimisation by the expedient use of economic, 
political, religious and secularist arguments by those who advocate the exis-
tence of but one civilisation in the world. 
 Conversely, Richard Bulliet, Richard Falk, John Esposito, and similar 
authors oppose the clash of civilisations thesis. Instead, they argue for coexis-
tence of civilisations. In this regard, the joint project inaugurated by the 
Turkish and Spanish governments to form an “alliance of civilisations” could 
provide a useful starting point. The most seminal ﬁgure in history of this 
approach is Ibn Khaldun, despite there being no mention of his name in 
today’s debates. Notwithstanding the fact that Ibn Khaldun had not been so 
naïve as to render civilisations impermeable to conﬂict, he never accepted the 
notion like Huntington or Lewis that diﬀerent values germinate conﬂict. 
 Clashes between civilisations, believed Ibn Khaldun, were not motivated 
by diﬀerences in cultural values, but by aspirations to achieve majd or hege-
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mony (Ibn Khaldun, 1981: II, 539, 542). He repeatedly reminded the reader 
that all strong civilisations desire their hegemony to be perpetual and bound-
less and this struggle for power degenerates into an all inclusive conﬂict. 
 Conversely, in his work oﬀering advice on how the world ought to be 
restructured, Huntington acknowledges the contemporary existence of vari-
ous civilisations that will clash. He was not the ﬁrst to coin the term ‘clash of 
civilisations’. A missionary, Basil Matthews, published in 1926, a book called 
Young Islam on Trek: A Study in the Clash of Civilisations (Mathews, 1926). 
Conspicuous is the mention of “clash of civilisations” in the book’s title. Mat-
thews maintained that Islam is an inveterately warlike and barbaric religion 
and it is utterly irreconcilable with reason and science.18 Shortly before the 
work of Matthews, Arnold Toynbee wrote a similar book entitled: The West-
ern Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilisations 
(Toynbee, 1923). The negative attitude vis-à-vis multiplicity of civilisations 
exhibited by Matthews at the turn of the last century survives today as the 
dominant view and politics of many groups. 
 The historical antecedents of Huntington’s argument are as follows. For 
him, the Thirty Years War (between Catholics and Protestants) was the last of 
the great wars of religion in Europe. The Treaty of Westphalia that ended the 
war inaugurated the modern nation-state based on principles of internal sov-
ereignty. The norm of ‘non-intervention in domestic aﬀairs’ meant that the 
Catholic Papacy would no longer be able to dictate its religious and political 
agenda on independent European states. For Huntington, World War I was a 
war of imperialism since it led to the collapse of four major empires (Russian, 
Austro-Hungarian, German, and Ottoman). World War II was a war of 
nationalism as new states emerged after this war. Prior to World War II, there 
were only 68 independent nation-states that existed in the world. Due to 
decolonisation struggles, new states emerged in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America. Today, there are more than 190 countries that comprise the 
United Nations. Further, Huntington argues that the Cold War was a war of 
ideology that divided the world into capitalist and communist camps. In 
part, he is responding to Fukuyama’s claims that ideological conﬂicts are over. 
Instead, Huntington is earnest to point out that the next series of wars will 
be on the basis of colliding civilisations. He speciﬁes eight dominant civilisa-
tions: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin 
American, and African. 
18  A repetition of the same attitude expressed in an uncanny resemblance in 2006 by Pope 
Benedict, is interesting insofar as it attests to the persistence of the exact Western attitude as 
regards the multiplicity of civilisations problem. 
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 The irreconcilable divergences in values between these civilisations, Hun-
tington surmises, will inevitably lead to conﬂict. Clearly, this is a simplistic 
argument that pigeonholes human beings into neat boxes. The assumption 
is that people cannot belong to multiple civilisations simultaneously. For 
instance, African-American Muslims can belong to, and be the by-product 
of, many civilisations. Multiple identities are a palpable reality and dissecting 
communities into these simplistic categories is at best an exercise in bad 
scholarship. Moreover, it fails to recognise that in today’s globalised world, no 
one civilisation is independent of another. Westernisation of East Asian soci-
eties creates ﬁssures between generations. Asian values of community, solidar-
ity, and group consciousness resonate in the West. Due to the shrinking of 
time and space, humanity may be witnessing the hybridisation of cultures. 
Finally, the claim that diverse civilisations cannot exist peacefully is fatuous 
and historically incorrect. A prudent inspection will demonstrate that several 
of the above civilisations, entirely or at least partially, were living under Mus-
lim governance during the time of Ibn Khaldun. They included the Islamic, 
African, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, and Western. Among the above men-
tioned, only the Chinese, Japanese and Latin American civilisations had been 
remote from Muslim rule. If, as Huntington suggested, inter-civilisational 
diﬀerences of culture and values inescapably lead to discord, then how was it 
that the relevant civilisations under Muslim rule were able to live together for 
many centuries? 
 The question remains for our inquiry how to adopt an intra-civilisational 
and inter-civilisational world order of peace and stability. Phrased plainly, in 
opposition to Huntington’s vision of a world order based on a simple dual 
logic dividing the world into Western and non-Western camps, Ibn Khaldun 
provides a reservoir for the founding of a world order predicated upon a 
multi-valued logic encompassing multiple civilisations. Being a system of 
thought instituted on a multi-valued logic, Fiqh in this transformation may 
provide a substantial source of inspiration. 
 At present, those searching to establish a multi-civilisational world order 
need to refer to the tradition of Fiqh and Ibn Khaldun’s discipline of ʿUmrān. 
Even today, many Western intellectuals, evocative of the Middle-Ages, per-
ceive multi-civilisations as a threat. Huntington is one of them. By embrac-
ing the ﬁrst attitude delineated above, these intellectuals promote the need 
for Western civilisation to annex other civilisations by force; and they regard 
the prospect of a harmonious coexistence of civilisations as unfeasible. 
 The thesis of the clash of civilisations echoes Western historical experience. 
It consisted of the struggle to impose upon the West, and then the rest of the 
world, a single denomination of Christianity during the Middle-Ages, and a 
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single ideology following the Enlightenment. Neither Western theologians 
ﬂourishing throughout the Middle-Ages, nor the secular thinkers of the mod-
ern era, were successful in formulating a conceptual apparatus to adequately 
solve the problem of plurality of civilisations. Thus, while internal conﬂicts 
within the West were widespread, clashes between the Western civilisation 
and others accentuated divisions. The Islamic civilisation has invariably occu-
pied the hub of these pertinent clashes. 
 The method of classifying the world into distinct civilisations and of inter-
preting international relations accordingly has been eclipsed from the 1950’s 
by theories of modernism and development. One important observer of this 
latter approach is Daniel Lerner (1965). His line of reasoning trivialises reli-
gion, and sees it as an ephemeral factor battling futilely the forces of modern-
ism. In retrospect, the theory of modernism had been founded upon a 
presumption of superiority, while expecting non-Western civilisations to 
increasingly embrace secular-Western culture as the only viable civilisation. 
The Emergence of Modern Turkey, the optimistic work by Lewis written in the 
same period could be regarded as a reﬂection of the modernist theory (Lewis 
2002). The best thing Muslims can do, Lewis argued, was to abandon the 
Islamic civilisation and voluntarily adopt the Western civilisation. 
 In a work entitled The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilisation, Richard Bulliet 
had put forth an antithesis critical of Lewis and Huntington (Bulliet 2004). 
Accordingly, from the angle of historical experiences, Islam and Christianity 
cannot be used as fodder for civilisational clashes. Conversely, the historical 
experiences of both civilisations are inextricably intertwined. In the book, Bul-
liet makes a strong case in defence of the close reciprocal relations throughout 
history between Islam and Christianity. Bulliet contended that the Islamic and 
Christian civilisations have many commonalities that can be used as a bulwark 
to establish harmonious relations. More than explicating and solving the mul-
tiplicity of civilisations, Bulliet’s work is aimed generally toward illustrating 
the historical nearness between Islamic and Christian civilisations. 
 Our central aim here is not to identify the advocates and opponents of the 
thesis of the clash of civilisations. Instead, the goal here is to probe into the 
reasons as to why the approach of Ibn Khaldun is persistently ignored in per-
taining debates. After all, he is the founder of the discipline of ʿUmrān and 
the one who applied civilisation to theories in political science and interna-
tional relations. The outlook of Ibn Khaldun has yet to be adopted in discus-
sions of civilisational clashes. This remarkable display of negligence resonates 
throughout the intellectual community, both Muslim and non-Muslim alike. 
 We have hitherto succinctly oﬀered a comparative presentation of positive 
and negative viewpoints vis-à-vis a multi-civilisational world order. Despite 
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deserving a privileged position as a sociologist of a multi-civilisational 
approach, Ibn Khaldun is not given the importance he merits. As we have 
already attempted to validate, however, Ibn Khaldun proﬀers a solid theoreti-
cal foundation to those who are trying to build a multi-civilisational order in 
our globalised world. 
 Inter-civilisational Relations 
 There are glaring diﬀerences between Ibn Khaldun and Huntington. How-
ever, there is an intriguing commonality between them. Both assign enor-
mous importance to the relations and conﬂicts among civilisations in 
reconﬁguring international relations. Also, both accept the importance of the 
relations among civilisations in determining the future of each. Such an 
approach breaks considerably from previous attempts of explicating the his-
tory of a speciﬁc civilisation by looking exclusively at its internal dynamics, 
conﬂicts, and crises. For instance, from this latter perspective which disre-
gards external relations between civilisations, the collapse of Islamic civilisa-
tion is attributed exclusively to its internal problems. Concurrently, the rise 
of the West is also attributed solely to its internal virtues. Likewise, from such 
an approach, Islam is viewed as ‘backward’, and the backwardness is ascribed 
to its internal dynamics. This logic neglects centuries of external assaults and 
colonial onslaughts that the Islamic civilisation has had to endure. In con-
trast, Ibn Khaldun and Huntington draw attention to the role of external 
factors on the venture of a civilisation. The Ibn Khaldunian approach, alter-
nately, maintains the requisite of using both internal and external reasons, 
comparatively, in explaining the venture of civilisations. Embarking from this 
approach, the discourse of ‘backwardness’ of the Islamic civilisation has 
become commonplace among intellectuals and academicians who accept it 
without critical analysis. Yet it presents nothing beyond an account based 
only on internal dynamics. This lack of attention to external variables makes 
the discourse of backwardness lose much of its virtue. As such, the Islamic 
civilisation has not regressed by itself; it has instead been thus far defeated 
and colonised following centuries of battles. 
 Proceeding from Ibn Khaldun, it could be asserted that the Islamic civili-
sation and the Ottomans collapsed as they had reached their apex. Ibn Khaldun 
argues that in prosperous societies, excessive progress, not backwardness, 
undermines the spirit of warfare and aptitude to defend against foreign 
attacks. From this perspective, the failure of the Islamic civilisation and its 
last major representative (the Ottomans) can be attributed to the weakening 
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group-spirit (‘asabiyya) which was necessary to withstand external attacks. 
Among these are the loss of Jerusalem to Crusaders, Andalusia to the Span-
ish, Baghdad to Mongols and the Ottoman defeat in WWI. In all these cases 
of defeat and invasion, history testiﬁes that Muslims had a more developed 
civilisation compared to their enemies. 
 Strong civilisations, Ibn Khaldun contends, are imitated by the weak. 
However, can a civilisation be equally strong in all areas? Today, regarding the 
attributes which Ibn Khaldun labels as the accidental qualities of a civilisa-
tion, the West looks preeminent. Thus, actuality has an overpowering status 
in preference to theoretical disputes. Masses allow actuality to be the judge in 
deciding the strength of a civilisation that they emulate. 
 Cultural and religious values endow the Islamic world with pre-eminence 
over the West even though it is comparatively weak militarily, technologically, 
and economically. Hence, the ultimate victor in the scuﬄe between the West-
ern and Islamic civilisations has yet to be determined. While Islam prolongs 
its global ascendancy, particularly in the West as the fastest growing religion 
in the world, ironically the Western armies are intervening, even overrunning 
various parts of the Islamic world. Sharply expressed, Islam is in the process 
of a cultural conquest, while the West, a military one. 
 In contrast, the Western civilisation is increasingly relinquishing all spiri-
tual and ethical claims, becoming consigned to a culturally feeble position. 
However, in the Islamic world, there is a spiritual revival, and a ‘return to 
roots’ phenomenon. At the same time, there is a secular tendency in the 
Islamic world where many Muslims imitate the material experience of the 
Western civilisation. While Islam retains the status of being the fastest grow-
ing religion in the West, Westernisation is relentlessly persevering in the 
Islamic world. Thus, for either side, absolute superiority seems improbable. 
 The rise and fall of a civilisation, Ibn Khaldun holds, is never eternal. 
According to Ibn Khaldun’s sociology of civilisations, the fundamental 
dynamic of history is the continuous cycle of civilisations. Linearity, in other 
words, is historically impossible and ascending or declining perennially is 
unviable. Instead, the more prevalent are cycles of rise and decline. 
 Perusing the Western civilisation embarking from Ibn Khaldun’s ʿUmrān 
theory, it is possible to extrapolate two ideas. First, the rise of the Western 
world, otherwise known as modern civilisation, has like others an end. Envi-
sioning her everlasting survival runs counter to the basic laws of history. 
Secondly, the end of Western civilisation will befall subsequent to its attaining 
high levels of perfection. Increasing prosperity is bound to weaken modern 
societies’ ability of defence, paving the way for the rise of other imperial 
societies. 
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 So long as the cultural, military, technological and economic supremacy of 
Western civilisation continues, other civilisations will continue to emulate 
the West. Thus the potential source of change lies in altering the balance of 
power. During its zenith, the Islamic civilisation elicited the imitation of 
members of other civilisations. However, with the rise of the Western civilisa-
tion, each and every civilisation in the world, including the Islamic, entered 
an uncritical and uncompromising race toward Western emulation. 
 Eﬀorts of westernisation and modernisation, however, by non-Western 
societies have invariably failed. Discounting the controversial case of Japan, 
it is impossible to indicate an example that has had complete success in 
achieving westernisation and modernisation to its utmost. This process of 
westernisation has been both symbolic and politically and economically 
transformative. It is reﬂected in attire, the adoption of Western legal codes, 
and an economic worldview based on liberal notions of openness and eco-
nomic integration with the world economy. Its ultimate goal is to create 
homogeneity among the multifarious civilisations of the world. 
 Imitation of the strong civilisation by the weak culminates in inter-civilisa-
tional addiction, attested by the varying degree of dependence on the West by 
non-Western civilisations. Non-Western civilisations are compelled to import, 
from the West, not only technological goods, but also productions of thought. 
 Conclusion: The Ibn Khaldun Paradox or the Circulation of 
Civilisations 
 Ibn Khaldun’s discipline of ʿUmrān is founded on a paradox. According to 
him, civilisations begin to collapse not as a result of their backwardness, but 
after they have reached the apex of progress. Consequently, as argued above, 
the Islamic civilisation and its last great representative the Ottomans collapsed 
after becoming prosperous par excellence. Once the Western civilisation pro-
cures the greatest frontiers of its development, so will it begin its downfall. 
Paradoxically, the warrior spirit and ability of self-defence dwindles in civilisa-
tions whose opulence increases. Hence, supreme triumph is tantamount to the 
end of a civilisation.
The history of civilisations, Ibn Khaldun avows, is replete with paradoxes 
and ironies, perhaps the most pivotal of which is the transformation of the 
perfection of civilisations leading to demise (Ibn Khaldun, 1981, II, 542.). 
This may also be called the ‘continuous cycle of civilisations’ or the ‘continual 
transformation of civilisations’. The continuous cycle of civilisations aspiring 
toward global ascendancy and the subsequent fall, Ibn Khaldun believes, is 
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inescapable. Circulation of civilisations, according to Ibn Khaldun, is a his-
torical canon impervious to deﬁance or alteration by the human will .
 Complementing the material approach of Ibn Khaldun’s ʿUmrān theory is 
the spiritual or cultural approach of the Fuqahā. While the discipline of 
ʿUmrān analyses, on the macro level, political and economic relations, Fiqh 
examines cultural relations on the micro level. The former conducts an 
empirical analysis of inter-civilisational aﬀairs, while Fiqh attempts to arrange 
those very aﬀairs normatively. Therefore, Fiqh does not exclusively proclaim 
norms regulative of Muslim life per se; it equally regulates, albeit limitedly, 
the relations of non-Muslim societies (Millahs) residing in Muslim domains. 
Within this framework, non-Muslims, referred to as dhimmi, preserve their 
civilisational identities. According to Ibn Khaldun, ʿUmrān is anchored in 
Fiqh. Consequently, it becomes evident that there was a reciprocal relation-
ship and mutual utilisation of both Fiqh and ʿUmrān in traditional Islamic 
and Ottoman-Turkish thought. 
 There exists a possibility, also today, of scrutinising inter-civilisational rela-
tions by conducting sociological macro analyses like that of Ibn Khaldun. 
Ibn Khaldun’s momentous discipline of ʿUmrān and the tradition of Fiqh 
may shed light on those desiring to reinterpret the inter-civilisational rela-
tions of today and recast it in a more pluralistic and peaceful mould. 
 For Ibn Khaldun, History with capital “H” does not exist and its cessation is 
unthinkable. In deﬁance of Fukuyama’s allegation, history has not ended and 
cannot end; the West has been unable to — and cannot in the future — 
incorporate all other civilisations in the world. Gazing into the future from 
the vantage point of Ibn Khaldun’s ʿUmrān approach, we can craft a viable 
model to construct a multi-civilisational world. Again, an Ibn Khaldunian 
worldview, as epitomised in the circulation of civilisations, might hint at 
the irredeemable failure of forging an everlasting Western dominance over the 
rest of the world. History is replete with examples of the rise and decline of 
civilisations. 
 In brief, future inter-civilisational relations will continue to be imbued with 
paradoxes and ironies, proceeding spirally on a rollercoaster journey, as it has 
been throughout history. If Ibn Khaldun’s circular conception of history and 
multi-civilisational world theory carries any veracity, it could justify the verity 
of thinkers who nurture a small lettered notion of civilisations, at the detri-
ment of Civilisation and a small lettered notion of history at the detriment of 
History. Thus, throughout this process of explicating and understanding inter-
civilisational relations, the discipline of ʿUmrān (science of civilisation), and 
the discipline of Fiqh may just provide inspirational sources. 
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